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THE ROLE OF 
ETHICS COMMITTEES 
IN ALLOCATING 
SCARCE MEDICAL 
RESOURCES
Faced with a potential crisis, in late  October the Centers for Disease  Control (CDC) appointed a 
permanent ethics panel to help it think 
through who should receive priority in 
the allocation of the scarce supply of the 
flu vaccine and how it should deal with 
future epidemics. According to a New 
York Times article, this was the “first 
time in its history” that the CDC had 
created such an entity.1 Perhaps it is a 
sign of the emerging legitimacy of public 
health ethics.2 Although ethics panels at 
the national level are not new, their use 
in the area of public health is a recent 
development. Prior and existing national 
ethics commissions have dealt with 
questions of life sustaining treatment, 
stem cell research, cloning, research 
on the decisionally impaired, and new 
reproductive technologies, but they 
have not generally addressed the thorny 
issues created by public health problems. 
Arguably, one of the most challenging of 
these is the allocation of scarce medical 
supplies and services during a potential 
public health crisis. 
While most institutional ethics 
committees deal with health care 
treatment issues that raise ethical 
principles of autonomy, beneficence, or 
nonmaleficence, they deal less frequently 
with issues of distributive justice. These 
latter issues are more likely to arise 
for policy makers at the local, state or 
national level when decisions need to be 
made about rationing scarce resources. 
But the situation with the distribution 
of the flu vaccine may have required 
hospitals, nursing homes, and possibly 
their ethics committees, to make some 
difficult rationing decisions. 
CDC Allocation Criteria
On Oct. 5th when Chiron Corporation 
announced that none of its influenza 
vaccine would be available for 
distribution in the U.S. for the 2004-
05 flu season, the CDC announced its 
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NETWORK NEWS
MARYLAND HEALTH 
CARE ETHICS 
COMMITTEE 
NETWORK (MHECN)
Recently, MHECN distributed its  member resource binder to  MHECN institutional members. 
The binder includes resources for ethics 
committee members, including relevant 
Maryland legislation, previous newsletter 
case studies, and video, website, and 
bibliographic resources. The binder will 
be a living resource, intended to house 
MHECN newsletters and future mailed 
additions. 
Educational Programs
On November 17, 2004 MHECN 
sponsored a conference on DNR issues at 
Charlestown Retirement Community in 
Catonsville, MD (see p. 5 for highlights of 
the conference). 
In Summer 2005 MHECN is planning 
a basic ethics education conference. Stay 
tuned for more details. 
Contact MHECN at (410) 706-4457; 
e-mail: www.MHECN@law.umaryland.
edu.
MHECN Program Coordinator: Anita 
J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
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plans to limit the remaining supply of 
the vaccine to adults 65 years of age and 
older, children 6 to 23 months of age, 
individuals with certain chronic illnesses, 
pregnant women, residents of nursing 
homes and children on chronic aspirin 
therapy. In addition, it recommended the 
vaccine for individuals who might spread 
the flu to high-risk individuals, including 
household contacts of infants under 6 
months of age and health care workers 
providing direct patient care.3 
In early November the CDC developed 
a second allocation plan for distribution 
to allocate the vaccine according to 
free market exchanges or the ability to 
pay.  While this may be an appropriate 
allocation mechanism for many goods 
and services, it seems ill suited to health 
care supplies that can influence who 
lives and dies. There were reports in the 
press about hospitals receiving offers 
from “greedy wholesalers eager to supply 
them with flu shots for $800 when a shot 
should cost about $10.”7 Even if hospitals 
or individuals were willing to pay this 
amount, it seems unfair that only those 
who could afford to pay such high prices 
would have access to the scarce good.
Utilitarian theories focus on 
distribution that will achieve the best 
outcomes or greatest good but leave us to 
debate how to define those concepts. Does 
it mean to distribute the vaccine in a way 
that will: 1) prevent those who are most at 
risk of contracting the flu from acquiring 
it; 2) save society the most money (i.e., 
give it to those who would cost society the 
most if they contracted the flu); 3) result 
in the greatest number of additional years 
of life (or "quality-adjusted life years") 
for those who receive it; or 4) result in 
the greatest number of lives saved of 
individuals who are most productive, wise 
or compassionate?  These are all possible 
utilitarian approaches.
The Role of Ethics Panels and 
Committees
While an ethics panel may help public 
health authorities think through these 
approaches by articulating them and 
helping apply them to various scenarios, 
such panels should not be the scapegoats 
when “wrong” decisions are made. The 
ultimate decision-makers must be those 
who are accountable to the public. If 
they are to rely on the recommendations 
of ethics panels, they should ensure that 
such panels not only include experts in 
the field of bioethics but also include a 
broad representation of views on what 
constitutes the public good so that our 
public officials are not hemmed in by 
a particular philosophy or parochial 
perspective. On the institutional level, 
ethics committees must also be viewed 
as fair and impartial bodies with both 
expertise and representation from the 
community the institution serves. For 
either a national panel or a local ethics 
committee to have any credibility it must 
be viewed as fair, knowledgeable and 
representative.
Notes
1Gardiner Harris, “U.S. Creates Ethics 
Panel On Priority for Flu Shots,” 
New York Times (Oct. 28, 2004) at A14.
2See  Nancy E. Kass, “Public Health 
Ethics: From Foundations and 
Frameworks to Justice and Global Public 
Health,” 32 J. of Law, Med. & Ethics  232 
(2004).
3Testimony of Dr. Julie Louise 
Gerberding, Director, CDC, before 
the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee, Subcommittee on Health 
(Nov. 18, 2004). Available at http://
energycommerce.house.gov/108/
Hearings/11182004hearing1404/
Gerberding2254. 
4“CDC and States Announce Plan 
to Distribute 10.3 Million Flu Shots 
Nationwide; Public Health Officials 
Call Allocation Fair and Aimed at Most 
Vulnerable Americans,” CDC Press 
Release (Nov. 9, 2004) available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/
r041109.htm.
5See Marian Ulhman & Virginia A. Smith, 
“Healthy seniors asked to forgo flu shots,” 
The Philadelphia Inquirer,” 
(Nov. 30, 2004) at 1.
6See Tom. L. Beauchamp & James F. 
Children, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 
3d edition (1989).
7Arthur L. Caplan, “Flu Shot shortage 
poses public health disaster,” at 
http://www.bioethics.net/articles.
php?viewCat=2&articleId=70 .
these categories, asked for additional 
guidance as to who should receive 
priority within this group. This was the 
case in southeastern Pennsylvania.  On 
November 30th, the front page headline in 
the Philadelphia Inquirer was “Healthy 
seniors asked to forgo flu shots.” 
According to the article, healthy seniors 
in southeast Philadelphia were asked 
to skip the flu shot this season to make 
sure there would be sufficient supply 
for the elderly with significant health 
problems. The proposal was made by 
the Delaware Valley Healthcare Council, 
which was responding to concerns that 
the federal guidelines had not been 
specific enough, especially to help nursing 
homes make tough decisions as to how 
to allocate the vaccine between residents 
and workers and among residents.5  In 
other states, public health authorities 
asked for guidance as to whether to 
send the vaccines to nursing homes or 
pediatricians’ offices.
Ethical Approaches to Distributive 
Justice
Allocation decisions put into play 
issues about who is most in “need” or 
most deserving or who can most “benefit” 
from the limited service or treatment. 
An ethics panel may be helpful in 
making recommendations under such 
circumstances. Beauchamp and Childress 
have articulated a number of approaches 
to distributive justice. These include 
egalitarian, libertarian and utilitarian 
theories.6  Much debate in the field 
focuses on which of these approaches 
should have priority. Under an egalitarian 
approach we would give everyone an 
equal share or an equal opportunity. In 
the context of the flu vaccine this might 
mean the young would have priority 
over the old as they deserve an equal 
opportunity at life; the elderly have had 
their opportunity. John Arras, a member 
of the CDC ethics panel and a professor 
of bioethics at the University of Virginia 
characterizes this as the “fair innings 
approach” in which “people are supposed 
to get a certain number of fair innings in a 
life time.” 
A libertarian approach would be 
THE METROPOLITAN 
WASHINGTON 
BIOETHICS 
NETWORK
The Metropolitan Washington  Bioethics Network co-sponsored  Georgetown University’s Bioethics 
Colloquium on November 11, 2004. 
Edmund Pellegrino, MD, Member of 
the International Bioethics Committee 
of UNESCO, spoke on “UNESCO’s 
International Bioethics Committee: The 
Quest for Universal Norms of Bioethics.”  
MWBN also continues its guardian 
training sessions with the D.C. Superior 
Court Probate Division. 
Contact: Joan Lewis, Executive 
Director, 202-895-9408, jlewis@iona.org 
of the remaining doses of the vaccine 
to the states based on 1) the number of 
high-priority individuals in the state, 2) 
the number of doses the state had already 
received and 3) the state’s unmet needs.  
Each state was then to distribute its 
allocation to its high priority groups.4
The Need for Additional Guidance
While the CDC made it clear that the 
vaccines should only be given to the very 
young, the very old, and the chronically 
ill, state and local health authorities, 
concerned that they might not have 
sufficient supplies to cover everyone in 
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DECONSTRUCTING 
“DO-NOT-
RESUSCITATE” 
ORDERS
On Wednesday, November 17,  2004, MHECN co-sponsored the  conference, “Still Hazy After 
All These Years—DNR Orders: 
Problems and Solutions,” at Charlestown 
Retirement Community in Catonsville, 
MD. Other sponsors included Erickson 
Retirement Communities, St. Agnes 
Hospital, and the Health Facilities 
Association of Maryland.
The morning began with a provocative 
keynote address by Glenn Treisman, a 
physician in the Department of Psychiatry 
and Behavioral Sciences at Johns 
Hopkins Hospital. Dr. Treisman spoke 
about “Unintended Consequences of 
DNR Orders.” These include health care 
providers (HCPs) too readily giving up on 
treatments that can enhance the quality of 
or prolong a patient’s life merely because 
a DNR order is present. Treisman has little 
faith in the ability of generic end-of-life 
wishes expressed in living will documents 
to effectively guide a physician’s decisions 
about whether to withhold attempts at 
CPR. Furthermore, since withholding 
CPR attempts through the writing of a 
DNR order carries these other “unintended 
consequences” that are not in the patient’s 
best interests, Treisman believes that DNR 
orders should be approached with caution. 
A better method of providing patient-
centered end-of-life care, Treisman asserts, 
is for the physician to have a relationship 
with the patient and make decisions that 
are informed by that relationship. If a prior 
relationship has not been formed, Treisman 
believes that in many cases, a physician’s 
judgment of the incapacitated patient’s best 
interest should trump the patient’s living 
will instructions. Attendees challenged 
this view by arguing that a relationship-
centered model is out of touch with how 
medicine is practiced today, that favoring 
trials of life-saving or life-prolonging 
technology (LPT) and discontinuing 
them if they don’t achieve the intended 
goal is at odds with the greater reluctance 
many HCPs have to withdrawing LPT, 
and that a physician’s judgment of what’s 
in a patient’s best interest can be biased 
toward that physician’s own moral beliefs 
or risk-averse practices. 
Gene Grochowski, an associate 
professor of Medicine at Johns Hopkins 
University School of Medicine and 
the Berman Bioethics Institute, gave a 
similarly cautionary address about DNAR 
(Dr. Grochowski prefers the term DNAR–
"Do Not Attempt Resuscitation") orders 
(“Unsuccessful CPR is Not the Problem, 
and a DNAR Order is Not the Solution”).  
According to Grochowski, DNAR orders 
can stifle conversation about end of life 
(EOL) care because they are seen as the 
solution.  Moreover, they create confusion 
regarding what interventions are permitted 
to prevent an arrest.  Grochowski also 
believes that health care providers go to 
illogical extremes by describing graphic 
details of cracked ribs and violent cardiac 
shocks to encourage dying patients to 
agree to a DNAR order (i.e., if you need 
CPR attempts, you can’t feel pain; you 
wouldn’t “experience” the “violent” 
CPR attempts).  He thinks it’s not the 
CPR attempts that most patients fear, but 
the possibility of surviving in a highly 
impaired, technology-dependent state. The 
latter can be avoided by being clear about 
the goals of LPT and physicians taking the 
initiative to withdraw LPT if the intended 
goals have not been achieved. Grochowski 
doesn’t advocate that physicians discuss a 
DNAR order initially with sick inpatients 
they’ve never met before. Rather, he 
advises that physicians ask the patient 
who the physician should talk to if the 
patient can’t make decisions him/herself. 
This opens the door to a more in-depth 
conversation after some rapport has been 
established, or, if the patient loses mental 
capacity, identifies a surrogate decision-
maker.
As part of a panel session, Glenna Earle 
(a nurse at Upper Chesapeake Medical 
Center-UCMC), Kevin Lynch (a physician 
at UCMC) and Martha Ann (Marty) 
Knutson (Legal Compliance Officer at 
Upper Chesapeake Health) addressed 
institution-wide problems with DNR 
orders. UCMC created a “Resuscitation 
Status” policy and a “Resuscitation 
Status Order" (a pink sheet for easy chart 
visibility that documents: 1) the patient’s 
decision-making capacity; 2) with whom 
resuscitation status was discussed; 3) the 
content of the discussion; 4) reasons for 
the resuscitation status; 5) whether or 
EMS/DNR ORDERS 
On September 21, Samantha Freed,   a third year law student and 
research assistant for MHECN, spoke 
with paramedics at the Woodbine Fire 
Department about Do-Not-Resuscitate 
(DNR) orders in the pre-hospital 
(outpatient) setting.  This article is based 
on excerpts from Freed's presentation.
Paramedics may recognize several 
types of EMS (emergency medical 
services)/DNR Orders as valid.  These 
include: 
•An original or copy of the Maryland 
EMS/DNR and Medical Care Order 
Form
•Another state’s EMS/DNR form 
presented in Maryland
•A Maryland EMS/DNR Bracelet 
insert
•A Medic Alert EMS/DNR Bracelet or 
Necklace
•An oral EMS/DNR Order provided 
by an on-line, EMS medical command 
and control physician
•An oral EMS/DNR Order provided 
by a physician who is physically present 
on the scene with the patient and the 
EMS personnel in the outpatient setting1  
EMS personnel in the pre-hospital 
setting may NOT acknowledge the 
following forms of a DNR order: 
•An advance directive without an 
EMS/DNR Order
•Facility-specific DNR orders
•Physician’s notes in medical records 
or prescription pad orders
•DNR stickers
•An oral request from someone other 
than a physician
•An oral order from an attending 
physician who is not on-site
•Any other device or instrument not 
listed as acceptable in the MIEMSS 
protocols2 
The Maryland EMS/DNR and 
Medical Care Order form was created to 
eliminate the burden on EMS personnel 
trying to decipher whether they may 
follow a DNR Order provided by a 
patient's family member.  The EMS/
DNR Order form takes the second-
guessing out of a situation which 
is already hectic, and where every 
minute is vital to life.  For example, 
if paramedics are presented with an 
advance directive barring resuscitation 
attempts, but there is no EMS/DNR 
Order Form, family members can very 
persuasively insist that the paramedic 
follow the advance directive (that 
is, not try to resuscitate the patient). 
But in this situation, EMS personnel 
are obligated to try to resuscitate the 
patient. Paramedics have so little 
time to evaluate the situation and act 
appropriately, it is not practical to ask 
them to interpret documents that vary in 
form and content.  This is also the reason 
that the EMS/DNR Order must be in a 
particular form.3  
Consider the following scenario: 
Two paramedics arrive on-scene to find 
a 92 year old woman unconscious. Her 
son does not present any documents 
but hands the phone to one of the 
paramedics. There is a voice on the 
other line that states “I am this woman’s 
physician and I have in front of me 
papers signed by the patient that say 
she does not want any attempts at 
resuscitation.” Because the physician is 
not on-scene, this is not a valid EMS/
DNR Order. However, if the paramedics 
in the scenario received orders from 
an on-line, EMS medical command 
and control physician not to attempt 
resuscitation, then the paramedics could 
refrain from attempting to resuscitate the 
patient.4  
Paramedics are put in a difficult 
situation when nursing home residents 
have not discussed DNR orders with 
their care providers, especially involving 
transport between a nursing home and 
emergency room.  Local paramedics can 
play a role in educating facilities they 
work with about the Maryland EMS/
DNR and Medical Care Order form.  
not to attempt full or limited CPR; 6) 
the signature of the physician; and, 7) 
if applicable, physician certifications 
of futility). Ms. Earle and Dr. Lynch 
discussed their successes and challenges 
in implementing the policy and form, and 
educating staff members, patients, and 
families about it. 
Marty Knutson then discussed 
“Futility, Liability, and other Legal 
Aspects of Foregoing CPR Attempts,” 
including the Maryland legal case, Wright 
v. Hopkins, “good faith” immunity, 
legislation allowing emergency treatment 
(such as CPR attempts) without consent, 
a patient’s right to have his or her EOL 
wishes honored (including refusals of 
CPR attempts), and issues related to 
medical futility of CPR attempts.
Philip Panzarella, MD, MPH of 
Franklin Square Hospital and Rev. Dr. 
Bob Steinke, of Frederick Memorial 
Hospital presented an interactive 
session demonstrating appropriate and 
inappropriate communication related 
to DNR orders.  They used video 
clips from the End of Life/Palliative 
Education Resource Center (EPERC) 
to illustrate their points.  See www.
eperc.mcw.edu.  Kelly Niles, MPA, at 
the Center for Aging Studies at UMBC 
and two residents from the Charlestown 
Retirement Community then spoke about 
the “Consumer-Directed Model” in 
which consumers make their own health 
care choices, with implications for EOL 
care.   
Concurrent sessions included how to 
proceed when a physician refuses to write 
medical orders (such as a DNR order) that 
are consistent with a patient’s wishes; 
discussing DNR in special settings (the 
neonatal intensive care unit, the operating 
room, and hospice); discussing DNR 
orders with religious- or culturally-based 
vitalists and ethnic minorities; and an 
open table discussion of legal issues 
surrounding DNR orders and the Patient’s 
Plan of Care Form that is being drafted by 
the Maryland Attorney General's Office.
If you have ideas for future MHECN 
conferences, or would like to co-sponsor 
a conference, please e-mail us at 
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu, or call 
(410) 706-4457.
This is especially true for nursing homes, 
since paramedics are often called to 
transport nursing home residents to the 
hospital or other health care settings.  
EMS/DNR orders may also apply to 
children. The Maryland Code authorizes 
EMS to follow the Maryland EMS/DNR 
and Medical Care Order form “pertaining 
to adult patients in the outpatient 
setting.”5  The Attorney General has 
written an advice letter about this 
provision and its application to minors.6 
Although the Maryland Code refers only 
to adult patients, EMS personnel are 
authorized to follow the Order form with 
respect to minor children if a parent or 
legal guardian has consented.  
Notes
1 The Maryland Medical Protocols for 
Emergency Medical Service Providers.  
Effective July 1, 2004.  Maryland 
Institute for Emergency Medical Services 
Systems, available at http://miemss.
umaryland.edu/Protocol2004Update.pdf, 
pp. 139-40.
2 Id.
3 See Md. Health Gen. Code Ann. §5-
608(c)(1) (2004).
4 See Md. Health Gen. Code Ann. §5-
608(c)(2)-(3) (2004). 
5 See Md. Health Gen. Code Ann. §5-
608(a)(1) (2004).  
6 For the full text of attorney general 
opinions and letters of advice related to 
EMS/DNR orders, visit http://www.oag.
state.md.us/Healthpol/legal.htm.
If you or your organization is 
interested in having Ms. Freed 
give a presentation on EMS/
DNR Orders in the pre-hospital 
setting, you may contact her at 
MHECN by e-mail at mhecn@
law.umaryland.edu or phone 
410-706-4457.  For a copy of 
the EMS/DNR Medical Care 
Order form, visit www.miemss.
umaryland.edu/DNRorder_
form.pdf. 
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In 1998 MHECN conducted a survey  of ethics committee members in  Maryland and found that over 60% of 
ethics committee members had no prior 
ethics education. One of the three tasks 
performed by ethics committees is ethics 
consultation (along with education and 
policy review). 
Ethics committee members who 
participate in ethics consultation should 
receive basic training in this area, but 
often don’t. One resource that has 
recently been made available to the 
public is the Neiswanger Institute’s web 
page, “Skill Building in Ethics Case 
Consultation,” at http://www.meddean.
luc.edu/depts/bioethics/ECE_index.htm.  
Power Point presentations with voiceover 
narration provide an overview of ethics 
case consultation in the U.S. (by Kayan 
Parsi, JD, PhD) and how to conduct and 
evaluate an ethics consultation (by Mark 
Kuczewski, PhD). There are also links 
to video clips of four simulated ethics 
case consultations showing student 
PHILOSOPHY 
CORNER – FOCUS 
ON ‘AUTONOMY’
Enlightenment is the release of  human beings from their self- incurred tutelage. Tutelage is 
the inability to use one’s own reason 
without direction from someone else. 
This tutelage is self-incurred when its 
cause does not lie in the lack of reason, 
but in the lack of resolution and courage 
to use it without direction from someone 
else. Sapere aude! Have courage to use 
your own reason!—that is the motto of 
the enlightenment.
What is Enlightenment? Immanuel 
Kant, 1784
Autonomy comes from the Greek 
words autos (‘self’) and nomos 
(‘law’), evoking the concept of “self-
governance” or “self-determination.”  It 
is the cornerstone of the Enlightenment 
period, when reason was embraced as the 
key to progress in science, politics, and 
the moral life. The philosophical origins 
of the Enlightenment are often attributed 
to a group of French philosophers 
who challenged the public’s deference 
to organized religion and political 
monarchy, which were  responsible for 
such atrocities as the Christian Crusades 
in the middle ages, and the burning of 
‘witches’ in the 17th century. Instead, the 
Enlightenment philosophers promoted 
the concepts of critical thinking, 
education reform, political democracy, 
and rational moral conduct. Rene 
Descartes (1596 – 1650) was one such 
philosopher. Known for his contributions 
to mathematics and to what later 
developed as the field of neuroscience, 
Descartes pursued fundamental questions 
about the relationship between external 
“reality” and how we perceive it. He 
explored connections between the 
mind in the form of thoughts, the brain 
and nervous system, and the “soul,” 
raising questions about whether “true 
knowledge” exists independent of 
the human mind, and proposing a 
systematic method of seeking objective 
knowledge (the scientific method). 
Enlightenment thinkers believed that 
human beings have free will, and that 
free will is exercised through rational 
thought. Ironically, recent discoveries in 
the fields of genetics and neuroscience, 
borne out of the groundwork laid by 
the post-Enlightenment’s scientific 
enterprise, question the existence of free 
will. Yet, autonomy requires free will—
despite competition from our genetic 
predispositions, deciding which actions 
are moral and choosing to implement 
them assumes that we are free to do so.
Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), another 
influential Enlightenment philosopher, is 
most closely associated with the concept 
of self-determination. Kant was an 
“idealist” in that he believed individual 
knowledge did not represent an external 
reality; rather, it was constructed by 
human minds taking in information and 
actively making sense of it. According 
to Kant, a truly moral person must 
transcend the passive acceptance of 
rules and norms handed down by his 
or her culture or religion and actively 
determine himself or herself what is right 
or wrong.1-3 Kant accorded more worth 
to rational duty-based acts than those 
motivated by emotions like compassion 
or love. Emotions can be inconsistent 
and illogical, whereas applied reason 
aimed at the right target (i.e., not solely 
at mundane desires like accumulation 
of material possessions or power for the 
sake of having it) more reliably leads to 
a citizenry that takes others’ perspectives 
fairly into account. An example of a 
reason-based mechanism that could assist 
one’s autonomous reasoning is Kant’s 
‘categorical imperative’: “Act only on 
that maxim which you can at the same 
time will to be a universal law.”4 For 
example, if you come up with your own 
rule, such as, “I must never lie to my 
patients,” you would test the validity of 
this rule by asking whether every rational 
health care provider could accept it. 
Critics of Kantian ethics point to 
its emphasis on reasoning ability as 
a significant flaw in that it favors 
individualism and excludes those with 
impaired or absent reasoning abilities. 
However, Kant viewed the application of 
individual autonomy as being embedded 
within community in that it requires 
taking others’ considerations into 
account, and treating others (particularly 
vulnerable persons unable to reason 
on their own) “as an end withal and 
never as a means merely.”4 The broader 
Kantian principle of “respect for persons” 
reflects this dual obligation: to promote 
individual self-determination, and to 
protect persons who are not rational 
agents by promoting their well-being 
and preventing them from being harmed. 
These concepts were formalized in 
the well-known text, “Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics,”5 by Beauchamp and 
Childress, who included the Kantian 
principle of respect for persons along 
with the principles of beneficence, non-
maleficence, and justice, which were 
adapted from W.D. Ross’s6 work. This 
principled approach was first introduced 
to the broader biomedical community 
in the 1970’s after the publication of 
Ethical Principles and Guidelines for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Research (commonly known as The 
Belmont Report)7. For several reasons, 
a focus on autonomy has dominated the 
principled approach in Western bioethics, 
and has recently been challenged as 
overly individualistic.8-9 Perhaps this 
is because of the tendency to interpret 
autonomy in the context of individual 
rights (things owed to a person), rather 
than Kant’s conception of autonomy as 
a commitment to using reason to guide 
moral actions. As Bramann summarized:
It is the faculty of reason that most 
powerfully connects human beings with 
each other, and which turns a merely 
natural society into a human community. 
In a society where all people base their 
important judgments on reason, where 
everybody makes an honest attempt to see 
things also from other people’s point of 
view, there will not be many unsolvable 
disagreements. It is only where people 
are ruled by their unacknowledged drives 
and unexamined passions that consensus 
and cooperation eludes them.1
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
Ethics & Research Consultant
Baltimore, MD
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consultants doing their best to mediate 
an ethical conflict. An accompanying 
evaluation template can be used to rate 
what you think the consultants did well 
and what needs improvement. These are 
excellent resources that your committee 
can use at an educational portion of a 
meeting or as a training tool for members 
involved in case consultation. 
Other approaches to increasing basic 
ethics education include short-term 
courses or workshops, such as the week-
long Georgetown Basic Ethics Education 
course. MHECN has sponsored basic 
ethics education for ethics committees, 
including a multi-class series at GBMC 
and Kennedy Krieger hospitals. Also, 
MHECN is planning a basic ethics 
education course for Summer 2005 
(specific date to be announced). Take 
advantage of these resources!
Cont. on page 7
SKILL BUILDING IN ETHICS CASE 
CONSULTATION 
Simulated ethics consult video link.
Photo courtesy of the Neiswanger Institute 
for Bioethics & Health Policy.  
See http://bioethics.lumc.edu.
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CASE 
PRESENTATION
One of the regular features of  the Newsletter is the presen-
tation of a case considered by an 
ethics committee and an analysis 
of the ethical issues involved.  
Individuals are both encour aged 
to comment on the case or analysis 
and to submit other cases with 
which their ethics committee has 
dealt.  In all cases, identifying 
information about patients and 
others in the case should only 
be provided with the permission 
of the individual.  Unless 
otherwise indicated, our policy 
is not to identify the submitter or 
institution.  Cases and comments 
should be sent to:  Diane E. 
Hoffmann, Editor, Mid-Atlantic 
Ethics Committee Newsletter, 
University of Maryland School 
of Law, 500 W. Baltimore St., 
Baltimore, MD 21201, or 
dhoffman@law.umaryland.edu.
CASE STUDY FROM
A MARYLAND 
EMERGENCY ROOM
Mrs. Daniels is a 75 year old  woman with a history of  dementia who is brought to the 
emergency room (ER) from a nursing 
home with a severe gastrointestinal bleed. 
Her records from the nursing home state 
that she is a Jehovah’s Witness and does 
not want a blood transfusion under any 
circumstances. There is no appointed 
health care agent and no one in her record 
identified to make medical decisions for 
her. Mrs. Daniels gave verbal consent 
for transport to the hospital to treat her 
symptoms (weakness, vomiting blood, 
black stools, lightheaded, low blood 
pressure when arising, fast heart rate, and 
shortness of breath). When she arrived 
she was alert and knew her name, where 
she was, and what month it was, but 
she didn’t know the year or exact day. 
When asked about her religion, Mrs. 
Daniels could only recall that she did go 
to church.  The physician explains to her 
that she is bleeding from her stomach 
and will die if she does not receive a 
blood transfusion.  Upon hearing this, 
Mrs. Daniels tells the physician she 
wants the blood transfusion if not having 
it means she will die. Shortly after, her 
adult children arrive and vehemently 
refuse for her to be transfused with blood 
products.  They insist that Mrs. Daniels 
doesn’t know what she is asking, due to 
her dementia. They believe she would 
not have asked for the blood transfusion 
if she did not have dementia. Unable to 
obtain synthetic blood products, Mrs. 
Daniels is given intravenous fluids and 
medications that temporarily stabilize 
her. However, after her children leave, 
Mrs. Daniels’ condition worsens—she 
vomits large amounts of bright blood, and 
becomes increasingly short of breath and 
dizzy.  Questioned again about a blood 
transfusion, she repeats, “I don’t want 
to die.” The physician decides to give 
the blood transfusion. However, after 
one unit of blood is given, Mrs. Daniels’ 
heart stops, she receives an unsuccessful 
attempt at cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(CPR), and dies. Upon returning, the 
family members see the empty blood 
bag hanging from their mother’s arm and 
become angry and distraught that their 
mother will be eternally shunned from 
their kingdom.
RESPONSE FROM AN 
EMERGENCY ROOM 
PHYSICIAN
The physician in this case faced a   true ethical dilemma. He wanted to  
 respect Mrs. Daniels’ autonomy, 
but how? Should he comply with her 
prior stated wishes not to receive blood 
transfusions, or go against them by 
accepting her request for a transfusion as a 
credible change of mind? Giving her one 
or more immediate blood transfusions had 
the potential to save her physical life while 
going against a religious prohibition she 
held when not demented. One might first 
ask, did Mrs. Daniels have the capacity 
to give informed consent for a blood 
transfusion? Consent is not legally or 
ethically valid when a patient who gives 
it lacks the capacity to understand the 
consequences of her choice. The family 
would likely argue such was the case 
here—that their mother lacked the ability 
to consent to a transfusion. Some might 
be inclined to infer that since no family 
member had been legally appointed to 
act in the patient’s stead, Mrs. Daniels 
had decisional capacity prior to this 
admission. However, it is important 
to separate the concepts of ‘mental 
competency’ (a legal judgment based on 
global mental capacity, often assessed 
as part of a guardianship proceeding) 
and decisional capacity (the ability to 
communicate a particular choice and 
understand the consequences of that 
choice). The fact that Mrs. Daniels 
had consented to be transferred to the 
hospital could provide some evidence 
that she could make specific decisions 
about her health and that she wanted 
treatment for this particular life-
threatening condition. The physician 
believed that Mrs. Daniels understood 
the gravity of the situation she faced—
that death was inevitable without a 
transfusion. She appeared fearful of 
dying, and articulated a wish to avoid 
this, even if it meant receiving a 
transfusion. 
Is the fact that dementia occluded 
Mrs. Daniels’ memory of her religious 
convictions relevant to her request for 
the transfusion? If one were to defer 
to her medical records, which stated 
no blood transfusions in accordance 
with her religious beliefs, one would 
not proceed to transfuse her. Yet, how 
is one to know, had she been able to 
remember her religious convictions, if 
she still would have chosen the blood 
transfusion? Is it possible that Mrs. 
Daniels abandoned those convictions 
and prior stated wishes surrounding 
blood transfusions in order to save 
her own life? Many times patients are 
brought to emergency rooms with living 
wills ruling out use of life support 
technology that they then ask for. The 
health care providers abide by the 
[capacitated] patient’s current decision, 
effectively nullifying his or her living 
will. All patients have the right to change 
their minds concerning their medical 
treatment. Where does autonomy dictate 
that the physician err in this case—on the 
side of believing Mrs. Daniel’s plea to 
avoid death or on the side of abiding by 
her prior stated wishes? 
A physician guided by the beneficence 
principle for this patient would do what (s)
he thinks best promotes the patient’s well-
being, but well-being can be defined by 
spiritual as well as physiologic outcomes. 
The dilemma in this case is that it is 
uncertain which one should have priority. 
Clearly, ethical principles don’t always 
point to a definitive course of action. Based 
on the need for a rapid response with no 
prior relationship with Mrs. Daniels or 
her family, the physician decided to err 
on the side of avoiding death and giving 
the transfusion. However, not acting more 
immediately achieved the unfortunate 
outcome of death after a blood transfusion. 
One could argue that the physician 
breached an ethical duty to inform the 
family that a blood treatment was going 
to be administered as per the patient’s 
request. However, their absence when the 
patient was critically unstable precluded 
such a conversation between the physician 
and family. Moreover, the fact that the 
patient requested the blood transfusion 
when the family members were absent 
raises the possibility that the patient felt 
pressured by the family to refuse the 
transfusion, and the physician may have 
felt an obligation to protect the patient 
from any possible family pressure.  The 
issue of family or ecclesial pressure has 
been discussed by Muramoto.1
Although ethics is distinct from law, 
physicians must act within the confines 
of the law when delivering patient care. 
Regarding the physician’s legal liability, 
he could be open to liability for wrongful 
death caused by delaying the blood 
transfusion, or battery (i.e., giving the 
transfusion against the patient’s prior 
stated wishes). However, these outcomes 
are unlikely given the lack of clarity 
regarding the patient’s wishes. The 
Maryland Health Care Decisions Act 
(§5-607) allows for emergency medical 
treatment for a patient who is incapable 
of making an informed decision if an 
authorized surrogate is not immediately 
available and the attending physician 
determines that “there is a substantial risk 
of death or immediate and serious harm 
to the patient,” and “with a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty, the life or 
health of the patient would be affected 
adversely by delaying treatment to obtain 
consent.” In this case, however, it was 
unclear whether the patient was incapable 
of making a decision. Moreover, if she 
were clearly decisionally incapable, the 
physician would have likely complied 
with her prior stated wishes and not 
given her the transfusion. What’s unique 
to this case is that the patient may have 
been decisionally capable of consenting 
to a blood transfusion, but there wasn’t 
time to find out. With a child, judges 
have determined in the past that parents’ 
religious values cannot be used to 
withhold life-saving medical treatment.  
Conversely, this patient is an adult but 
one with limited autonomy (the extent 
of which is in question) due to her 
dementia. There is legal precedent for an 
appointed proxy deciding against a blood 
transfusion for a mentally incapacitated 
Jehovah’s Witness adult.  In that case, the 
appointed surrogate was also a Jehovah’s 
Witness.1  However, in this case there 
was not time to seek a court order (which 
raises the question—if there were time, 
would the physician have been obligated 
to do so?). 
The Jehovah’s Witness (JW) community 
might contend that it’s rare for a card-
carrying JW believer to rationally change 
her mind about receiving blood; that her 
core belief in eternal salvation trumps any 
momentary lapse of faith, fear, or cognitive 
impairment that might underlie a request 
for blood products. Yet, perhaps the 
professional autonomy of the physician also 
deserves respect. That is, for many reasons, 
Mrs. Daniels’ physician is more concerned 
about mis-identifying the rare exception 
(i.e., letting an unwilling JW patient die 
unnecessarily), than about violating a 
JW patient’s religious prohibition. Were 
the physician of the JW faith, he might 
think differently. The difficulty faced by 
emergency physicians daily is that they 
must make life and death decisions with 
little time to weigh psychological and 
spiritual variables. There was not time for a 
court hearing or ethics consultation on the 
patient’s mental capacity in this scenario. 
I would argue that it’s too much to ask 
this physician to disregard his patient’s 
request for blood transfusions without more 
conclusive information about whether her 
request was valid. However, this patient 
should have been treated sooner and with 
more blood to be of benefit. Unfortunately, 
this is a case of too little, too late.   
Eva  C. Dickinson, M.D.
Department of Emergency Medicine
Shore Health System of Maryland
Note
1. Muramoto, O. (1998). Bioethics of the 
refusal of blood by Jehovah Witnesses: Part 
1. Should bioethical deliberation consider 
dissident views? Journal of Clinical Ethics, 
24(4), 230-239.
RESPONSE FROM A 
JEHOVAH'S WITNESS 
LAWYER
One of the fundamental principles  of modern medicine is that  patients have the right to control 
what is done to their own bodies.  This 
principle, more formally known as the 
doctrine of bodily self-determination, 
places obligations on both patients and 
their doctors.  Patients have an obligation 
to make their wishes known, especially 
if they strongly object to certain types 
of medical treatment on the basis of 
their religious or personal beliefs.  As a 
corollary, doctors have an obligation to 
obtain their patients’ informed consent 
before administering any type of medical 
treatment or procedure.
In the case study, the patient is 
described as a 75-year-old woman with a 
history of dementia who was brought to 
an emergency room from a nursing home 
with a severe gastrointestinal bleed.  She 
is also described as having records at 
the nursing home that list her as one of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses.  These records state 
that she would refuse blood transfusions 
under any circumstances.  Her treating 
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS
January
31 12:00PM-1:30PM (free) Human genetic databases: Towards an international frame work. Bernice Elger, Ph.D., The 
Emanuel & Robert Hart Lecture Series, University Of Pennsylvania Center For Bioethics, 3401 Market Street, Suite 
320, Philadelphia, PA. For more information, visit http://www.bioethics.upenn.edu/.
February 
10 7:00 PM  Leon Wieseltier, Literary Editor, The New Republic. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Insight 
Lecture Series on the exhibit Deadly Medicine: Creating the Master Race. Admission is free, but seating is limited. For 
reservations call 202-488-0407. The Deadly Medicine exhibit runs through October 16th, 2005, and will be open before 
and following the program. Doors open at 6 p.m.
14-18 Becoming an Ethics Consultant (intensive training course). St. Francis Medical Center, Honolulu, Hawaii. Speakers 
include: Howard Brody, MD, PhD, Jing Jih Chin, MD, Lawrence J. Schneiderman, MD and others. For more 
information visit http://www.bioethicshawaii.org or contact Jan Miyamoto, telephone 808-547-6050; e-mail: janm@
sfhs-hi.org.
24 4:00 PM-5:00 PM (free)  Andrea Kalfaglous, PhD, Reproductive Genetic Engineering Technologies:  Hope and 
Fears for Our Genetic Future, University of Maryland Medical Center Medical Humanities Hour.  Shock Trauma 
Auditorium.  Contact: hsilverm@medicine.umaryland.edu.
25–26 Western Regional Bioethics Conference, sponsored by the Arizona State University Bioethics Club, Bioethics Program 
at Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. Contact: Ryan Childers at wrbc@asu.edu or 480-965-8627, or visit http://
lifesciences.asu.edu/bioethics/wrbc/.
March 
3-4 3:00 PM-4:00 PM  Catholic Health Care Ethics:  Foundations and Applications.  Sponsored by the Catholic Health 
Association of the United States and the Neiswanger Institute for Bioethics and Health Policy, Loyola University, 
Chicago, Stritch School of Medicine, Chilcago, IL.  Visit www.bioethics/umc.edu/.
8 12:00PM-1:30PM (free) Barbara Coombs Lee, JD, RN (title of talk to be announced), The Emanuel & Robert Hart 
Lecture Series, University Of Pennsylvania Center For Bioethics, 3401 Market Street, Suite 320, Philadelphia, PA. For 
more information visit http://www.bioethics.upenn.edu/.
5-12 Humanistic Medicine, Self-Care and the Art of Life Well-Practiced. The 35th Annual Conference of The Society for 
Humanism in Medicine, The Keystone Resort and Conference Center, Keystone, Colorado. For more information, 
visit: http://www.humanisminmedicine.org or e-mail Ann Colston Wentz, MD, at annewentz@humanisminmedicine.
org.
11 In the Nation's Compelling Interest:  Eliminating Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Status (Conference), 
University of Maryland School of Law, Baltimore, MD.  Contact  Lu Ann Marshall, 410-706-4128, lmarshal@law.
umaryland.edu.
17 7:00 PM  Leon Kass, MD, University of Chicago. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Insight Lecture Series on 
the exhibit Deadly Medicine: Creating the Master Race (see February listing above for contact information). 
April
7-9 The Ethics of Bioethics, a Conference co-sponsored by The American Society of Bioethics and Humanities and the 
Albany Medical College/Graduate College of Union University Bioethics Program. The Albany Medical College and 
the Inn at College Park of Union College. Abstracts accepted through February 15. For more information visit http://
www.bioethics.union.edu, or contact Ann Nolte at bioethics@union.edu, 518-388-8045.
Case Study
Cont. from p. 9
physician feels that she needs blood 
transfusions and apparently the patient has 
given consent, but the consent is not clear.  
The first question facing ER personnel 
is whether or not the patient has sufficient 
decision-making capacity to make medical 
decisions for herself.   If she has capacity 
and is able to clearly express her wishes, 
her decision should be respected and no 
further inquiry is needed.  
However, in this case, the patient’s 
history of dementia, her answers to certain 
basic questions, and her lack of clarity on 
the issue of whether she would consent to 
blood transfusions compared to her prior 
expressed wishes has called into question 
her capacity.  This means that the records 
maintained by the nursing home have 
become exceptionally important.  In many 
cases, Jehovah’s Witnesses have executed 
statutorily valid advance directives 
that: 1) clearly indicate their refusal of 
blood transfusions; 2) state their wishes 
concerning procedures involving the use 
of their own blood; and, 3) state their 
wishes concerning end-of-life matters.  
These documents, commonly known as 
a “DPA-card” in the Witness community, 
are statutorily valid in all 50 states and the 
District of Columbia, and can be relied 
on as a legal expression of the person’s 
wishes.
The nursing home should be contacted 
to determine whether or not the records 
they maintain on the patient include 
a “DPA-card” or a similar advance 
directive.  Again, if such a document 
exists, whether or not a health care agent 
has been appointed, the patient’s wishes 
are clear.  This document is controlling, 
notwithstanding the wishes of other family 
members or even the treating physician.  
For example, in the case In re Duran, 
the Pennsylvania appellate court upheld 
a Witness patient’s refusal of blood as 
recorded in her Pennsylvania health-care 
power of attorney over the objections of 
her non-Witness spouse.1
Assuming no such document exists, 
the physician should seek direction from 
the court as to how to proceed.  While 
the exact procedure to do so varies from 
state to state, an important principle in 
these types of cases is that doctors should 
not be placed in the position of becoming 
adversaries of their patients.  As the 
Supreme Court of Florida explained in 
a case involving a Jehovah’s Witness 
patient and blood transfusions, “a health 
care provider must not be forced into 
the awkward position of having to argue 
zealously against the interest of its own 
patient.”2  Therefore, the Florida court 
directed that the state’s attorney must 
be contacted by hospitals or physicians 
when there is a dispute about patient 
care.  While this procedure is arguably 
more cumbersome for the physician than 
approaching the court directly, it actually 
serves to insulate the doctor and hospital 
from liability by removing them one step 
from the legal proceedings.
In this case, there was a window of time 
to commence legal proceedings after the 
patient was admitted once the patient’s 
relatives arrived and the potential conflict 
was identified.  The patient was stabilized 
for a period of time while she was given 
intravenous fluids and other medications.  
Arguably, the state’s attorney and the 
judge could have been contacted during 
this time period, presented with the facts, 
and asked for a decision.  In most courts, a 
judge is available 24 hours a day to handle 
these types of emergencies.
In the event there is insufficient time for 
a judicial determination to be made, the 
physician must use his best judgment in 
rendering medical care.  Of course, there 
are potential consequences for proceeding 
without clear direction from the patient 
or direction from the court.  If blood is 
given, the foremost of these consequences 
is a potential lawsuit for battery.  This is 
particularly true when, as the case study 
suggests here, the patient’s family is 
adamant about the patient’s refusal and is 
upset about the transfusion.  
As this case study demonstrates, 
patients should be encouraged to execute 
advance directives to avoid foreseeable 
conflicts in their healthcare.  This is 
particularly true when it comes to patients 
who refuse treatment on the basis of their 
religious beliefs.  
Finally, Jehovah’s Witnesses do 
not believe that they will be ‘eternally 
shunned from the kingdom’ for receiving 
an involuntary blood transfusion.   
Nonetheless, even involuntary transfusions 
are viewed as a violation of one’s body 
and result in many of the same emotions 
and feelings of spiritual worthlessness 
experienced by rape victims.  Hopefully, 
by discussing these matters in advance, 
these types of physician/patient conflicts 
will be minimized to the benefit of all 
parties involved.  
Adam G. Linett
Associate General Counsel
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of 
New York, Inc. 
Legal Department
Notes
1 In Re Duran, 769 A.2d 497 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2001).
2 In Re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 823 (Fla. 
1993).
_________________________________
_____
We welcome comments to this case 
study, including how cases such as this 
are handled at your institution. Please 
e-mail your comments to MHECN@
law.umaryland.edu.
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